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III.
PETITION
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
appellants petition this court to rehear and reconsider its Opinion
in this case dated October 25, 1993.
In support of this petition, appellants rely on the argument
below.
IV.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THIS
COURT'S OPINION HAS OVERLOOKED TWO LANDMARK
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
This case involves multiple parties.
party.

Schoney is the named

However, the unnamed class members are also parties with

distinct rights.

See American Pipe & Construction v. Utah. 414

U.S. 538 (1974).
This

Court's

Opinion

begins

with

Schoney!s personal claim has been lost.

the

proposition

that

Next, this Court reasons

that, because Schoney1s personal claim is lost, the claims of the
unnamed class members are, therefore, also lost.

In holding that

the claims of the unnamed class members are lost, this Court relies
upon traditional concepts of res

judicata

(Slip Opinion at p. 3 & 4.)

1

and "law of the case."

However, traditional concepts such as res judicata

and "law of

the case" cannot be rigidly or automatically applied in class
actions:
Application of the personal-stake requirement
to a procedural claim, such as the right to
represent a class, is not automatically or
readily resolved, . . . A "legally cognizable
interest" in the traditional sense rarely ever
exists with respect to the class certification
claim.
United State Parole Commission v. Geraqhtv. 445 U.S. 388, 402
(1980) (Emphasis added).
In two landmark opinions, the United States Supreme Court has
dealt with the specific issue in this case: viz. what happens to
the rights of the unnamed class members when the named class member
(Schoney) is no longer eligible to represent the class.

See

Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); and
United States Parole Commission v. Geraqhtv, supra.

In Geraqhtv,

the court stated:
We can assume that a district court's final
judgment fully satisfying named plaintiffs1
private substantive claims would preclude
their appeal on that aspect of the final
judgment; however, it does not follow that
this circumstance would terminate the named
plaintiffs1 right to take an appeal on the
issue of class certification.
Geraqhtv. 414 U.S. at 402.
It is respectfully submitted that this case involves important
constitutional rights for hundreds, if not thousands, of unnamed
class members.

Rehearing should be granted to analyze these

important constitutional rights in light of Roper and Geraahty,
supra.

Indeed the converse is also true, this case cannot be

properly analyzed without reference to Roper and GeraahtyP supra.
POINT II
THIS COURT'S CURRENT OPINION (IN SCHONEY II)
HAS INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE PRIOR OPINION
OF THIS COURT (IN SCHONEY I)
A separate panel of this court has issued a prior opinion in
this case.

Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc.. 790 P.2d 584 (Utah

App. 1990) (Schoney
panel (in Schoney

I) . A threshold issue presented to the present
II)

is whether Schoney

I had disposed of certain

class issues; or in the alternative, whether Schoney
failed to reach those issues.

I had simply

With respect to that threshold

issue, this panel has written:
Our review of the trial court's ruling and our
decision in Schoney's prior appeal [Schoney I]
reveals that the trial court ruled against her
on the "decertification" issue and that we
affirmed the trial court.
(Slip Opinion at p. 3, fn. 3.)
However, this court's interpretation (above) is based upon a
misreading of Schoney

I.

Schoney

I specifically states:

We affirm as to the default judgment and
accordingly have no need to consider the
propriety of the summary judgment.
790 P.2d at 584.

(Emphasis added.)

Rehearing should be granted to analyze this case in light of
the explicit language of Schoney

I quoted above.
3

POINT III
APPELLATE COURT'S SHOULD NOT RELY UPON
SILENCE TO INTERPRET IMPORTANT CLASS ISSUES
As noted in Point II, above, a threshold issue, in this appeal
(Schoney

II),

required this panel to interpret a prior opinion of

a different panel (in Schoney
Schoney

I).

This panel's interpretation of

I was based entirely upon the failure of Schoney

discuss certain class issues.
silence (in Schoney

I)

I to

This panel interpreted the panel's

as affirming the trial court.

Thus this

panel has written:
We determined (in Schoney I) that affirmance
of the judgment by default was in order and
that this was sufficient to conclude the case
without addressing other [class] arguments.
* * *

We need not discuss or analyze every argument
made by a party on appeal . . . the nature and
extent of an opinion is within the discretion
of the court.
(Slip Opinion at pp. 3-4, fn. 4.)
It is certainly true that, in a "garden variety" case, an
appellate court might dispose of some issues by silence. However,
in a procedurally

identical case, the Utah Supreme Court has

refused to interpret the silence of a prior opinion to preclude
class action claims.

See American Tierra Corp. v. City of West

Jordan. 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992).
We have no way of knowing today whether our
Call I affirmance should have been treated as
the final resolution of the class question.

. . • The dissent's conclusion that Call I
resolved the class certification appeal sub
silento
is unwarranted.
840 P.2d at 762, fn. 4.
POINT IV
THERE CAN BE NO WAIVER BECAUSE THE CLASS
WAS WITHOUT A REPRESENTATIVE
This panel's decision (in Schoney

II)

states that all of the

present issues were waived by failing to file a Petition for
Rehearing,1 and by failing to file a Petition for Certiorari.2 See
Slip Opinion at p. 4, fn. 5.

However, this panel's conclusion on

waiver fails to consider that separate parties (named plaintiff and
unnamed class members) are involved in a class action.
A plaintiff who brings a class action presents
two separate issues for judicial resolution.
One is a claim on the merits; the other is the
claim that he is entitled to represent a
class.
United States Parole Commission v. Geraqhty, 445 U.S. 388, 402
(1980).
Therefore, the question is not whether Schoney should have
filed a Petition for Rehearing or a Petition for Certiorari;

*A11 of Schoney1s arguments were presented to the prior panel
of this court in Schoney I.
It seems a heavy burden to hold that
a party "waives" rights by failing to tell the court twice. If
uncorrected, this opinion will lead every careful attorney to file
a petition for rehearing in every case; and that will certainly
present a huge new burden to the appellate courts of this state.
Petitioner is unaware of any other case which holds that an
issue is waived by failing to seek a writ of certiorari.
5

rather, the issue is who could file such a petition on behalf of
the class. In other words, after Schoney1s personal claim, on the
merits, was lost, the issue became whether Schoney could still
represent the class.

That issue had to be presented back in the

trial court.
Our conclusion that the controversy here is
not moot does not automatically establish that
the named plaintiff is entitled to continue
litigating the interests of the class. . . .
Upon remand, the district court can determine
whether Geraghty may continue to press the
class claims or whether another representation
would be appropriate.
Geraahty, supra at pp. 405, 407.
That is exactly the procedural posture of this case.
the panel, in Schoney

After

I, ruled against Schoney's personal claim,

the case had to go back to the trial court to determine who would
represent the class with respect to the unresolved class issues.
V.
CERTIFICATION
The undersigned, counsel of records, hereby certifies that the
foregoing Petition for Rehearing is tendered in good faith and not
for purposes of delay.
DATED this

v
Q

day of November, 1993.
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copies of the

foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING (Schoney v. Memorial Estates, et
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